Justin Bieber in BRASILIA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BRASILIA 002002

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/25/2016
TAGS: PREL SNAR BR
SUBJECT: BRAZIL: MISSION RECOMMENDATION FOR RENEWAL OF BRAZIL'S ABD PROGRAM

REF: A. STATE 139897
¶B. STATE 102423
¶C. BRASILIA 1450
¶D. 05 BRASILIA 2683 Classified By: POLITICAL COUNSELOR DENNIS HEARNE. REASONS: 1.4 (B)(D).

¶1. (SBU) Summary. Mission Brazil herewith recommends annual recertification by the President of Brazil's Air Bridge Denial Program (ABD),
based on the information below, which is formatted in paras 2-9 in accordance with Department's instructions in ref A. End summary. PART A:
GOB ADHERENCE TO AGREED SAFETY AND OPERATIONAL PROCEDURES:

¶2. (C) Per ref B instructions, PolCouns, Air Attache and Assistant Air Attache met on 13 July at the Defense Ministry with Major Brigadeiro
do Ar (three star equivalent) Ricardo Machado Viera, who commands Brazil's integrated air defense and air traffic control system (COMDABRA),
to consult on the status of Brazil's air bridge denial ("shootdown") program. Machado, who was accompanied by two other officers from the ministry,
 has senior operational command authority over all aspects of air defense and air traffic control in Brazil, and has been involved in all
discussions with the USG on the shootdown issue for several years. Machado understands the USG's process for renewal of the Presidential
Determination covering U.S. cooperation with Brazil in its ABD program, and he provided (or undertook to provide) answers regarding issues
raised in reftel. On key points, he affirmed: (1) that there have been no/no lethal force events in the program over the past year, and (2)
there have been no/no changes in the operational and safety procedures referenced in the September 2004 exchange of diplomatic notes between
the GOB and USG. Moreover, he offered a review of the program's functioning in practice, reiterated that Brazil's program is focused on dissuasion,
and offered (in confidence) his assurance that Brazil's air force would only use lethal force in the context of a carefully pre-planned operation
coordinated with police authorities, in which there is certainty about the criminal identity and intent of any suspect, non-cooperative aircraft.

¶3. (C) With regard to ref B issues, Machado affirmed to PolCouns and DAO officers that: -- There have been no/no incidents of use of lethal
force since the advent of Brazil's ABD program until the present date -- neither warning shots nor rounds fired with the intent of disabling/
destroying a suspect aircraft; -- There have been no/no changes of any kind in the Brazilian program's operational and safety procedures from
those referenced in the September 2004 exchange of notes between the GOB and USG regarding Brazil's ABD program; -- Brazil's ability to "see"
and track unusual and suspect air activity has improved dramatically with the full implementation of the SIVAM Amazon surveillance system
(which uses both ground radar and Embraer R-99 AWACs-type aircraft), introduction of the A-29 ALX "Super Tucano" fighter aircraft and secure data
links. As a result, there is an increase in the number of "air tracks of interest" recorded by COMDABRA over the past year. Machado undertook to
provide asap his command's statistics on ATOIs, interceptions, and force downs from October 2005 to 30 July 2006.

¶4. (SBU) While the operational and safety procedures of Brazil's program are unchanged from those referenced in the September 2004 exchange of
notes, the increased capacity and sophistication of BRAF equipment and methods are enhancing the program's efficiency and safety, Machado said.
The R-99 airborne radar aircraft acquired for Brazil's SIVAM program are providing vastly improved coverage, especially when deployed for
intensive patrols to areas where there is a  perceived spike in irregular air activity. The R-99 aircraft can interact seamlessly via data
links with ground bases and with the A-29 interceptors now coming on line with the BRAF, which are faster, have longer range, and possess
sophisticated avionics and surveillance equipment. For example, Machado said an R-99 can locate and track a suspect aircraft beyond visual
range, then "stand off" on station as an A-29 moves into position to trail the suspect craft. The A-29 can transmit video images of the suspect
plane in real time to both the R-99 and COMDABRA ground stations, and all radio communications between the BRAF interceptor and the suspect
plane are also transmitted. Hence the type, tail number and physical aspect of the plane can be seen, facilitating identification by BRAF and
the police. The video and audio records are available for after-action assessment or investigation.

¶5. (C) Machado said that the BRAF and COMDABRA now also have superior data bases and modalities in operation for checking suspect aircraft.
COMDABRA center commanders are linked directly by secure phones to senior Brazilian Federal Police (DPF) officials in Brasilia and can instantly
check tail numbers or other data against police records. All coordination with the DPF is centralized at DPF headquarters in Brasilia, and the
BRAF will not act on information or requests for air force support coming from DPF field offices, or from state police agencies. The BRAF also
has its own data base of tail numbers of civil aircraft that have irregular or suspect flight histories in Brazilian air space.

¶6. (SBU) Emphasizing that the GOB's approach to its ABD program has always been focused on its use as a tool of dissuasion, Machado noted that,
before implementation of the shootdown legislation, narcotrafficking pilots would brazenly ignore BRAF fighters' orders, and even non-criminal
pilots would sometimes take a nonchalant attitude toward responding to air force hails. Now, aircraft intercepted, hailed and interrogated by
COMDABRA aircraft have a "100 percent" rate of responding and obeying, he added.

PART B: SITE VISITS TO AIR TRAFFIC CONTROL CENTERS:

¶7. (SBU) Ref A requested site visits by Embassy officers to at least two air traffic control facilities in Brazil, to confirm the level of
awareness among ATC personnel of Brazil's ABD program and its procedures. Mission reiterates ref C information that all/repeat/all air traffic
control in Brazil, including civil aviation, is handled by uniformed Brazilian Air Force personnel. The ATC centers are co-located with air
defense centers at four BRAF facilities which conduct ATC/air defense for the entire country. These four regional BRAF Centers for Air
Defense and Air Traffic Control (CINDACTA's) are in addition to air traffic "towers" at larger airfields which control only local take-offs
and landings. Hence unlike the U.S., civil air traffic control in Brazil is not dispersed to various regional, state, and municipal airports,
but is concentrated exclusively in the four air force centers. Embassy has received BRAF authorization to visit two of the centers on 26-27
September: CINDACTA II in Recife (covering northeastern Brazil) and CINDACTA I in Brasilia (covering central Brazil). Embassy DAO personnel
will make the site visits and we will report findings immediately thereafter via septel.

PART C: GOB EFFORTS TO PUBLICIZE ABD PROGRAM:

¶8. (U) On 16 September, PolCouns, Air Attache and Assistant Air Attache again met with Brigadeiro Machado, COMBADRA commander, at his
headquarters in Brasilia. Per ref A questions, Machado provided the following information on GOB and BRAF measures to publicize the existence
and procedures of Brazil's ABD program since it entered into force in October 2004: -- Machado confirmed that the GOB had issued Notice to
Airmen (NOTAM) bulletins, per international procedures, when BRASILIA 00002002 003 OF 003 Brazil's program was publicly announced by then-Defense
Minister Viegas in October 2004. Per standard NOTAM procedures, the NOTAM remained published for 56 days, until such time as information
about the ABD program was permanently incorporated into Brazil's Aeronautic Information Package (AIP). The information is now contained in the
AIP, and is available on the BRAF's website, Machado said, adding that Brazil's civil aviation law has also been amended to reflect the ABD
program's existence and scope. -- The GOB and BRAF also undertook a 30-day media campaign in October 2004, with both the Defense Minister and
Machado conducting extensive interviews with national TV, radio and print media, Machado said. In addition, posters outlining the ABD program
and its procedures have been posted in public spaces and pilot ready rooms (where flight plans are logged) at airports throughout Brazil,
Machado said.

PART D: STATISTICS:

¶9. (SBU) In response to Mission request, the BRAF provided in an official communique to the Mission the following statistics for the Brazil
ABD program, for the period from 1 September 2005 through 31 July 2006: I. Unknown air tracks: 4,567 II. Suspect air tracks (i.e., considered
suspect owing to routes utilized, but not necessarily illegal); OBS: This number is included in I: 108 III. Interceptions realized: 254 IV:
Enforcement measures applied: a. Change of route: 1 b. Obligatory landing: 1 c. Warning fire: 0 d. Destructive fire: 0 V. Quantity of drugs
aprehended by police authorities as consquence of realized interceptions: 564 kg. VI. Statistic for daily average of unknown air tracks: 21.7
(Embassy Note: Machado confirmed that IV a and b, and V refer to the joint BRAF-Federal Police operation described by Machado in ref C. End
Embassy note.)

MISSION RECOMMENDATION:

¶10. (SBU) It is this Mission's assessment that Brazilian Air Force and GOB procedures for the Brazilian Air Bridge Denial program continue to
fully comply with the mutually agreed terms referenced in the September 2004 USG-GOB exchange of diplomatic notes constituting our bilateral
understanding of Brazil's program. On that basis, and subject to septel provision of information deemed satisfactory by Department for Part B
above, this Mission recommends Presidential recertification of the Brazil ABD program in October 2006.

Justin Bieber in BRASILIA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BRASILIA 001938

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR WHA, INL, AND L

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/30/2014
TAGS: SNAR PREL MOPS BR POL MIL
SUBJECT: INTERAGENCY DELEGATION DISCUSSES INFORMATION-SHARING REGARDING BRAZIL'S SHOOTDOWN PROGRAM (CORRECTED COPY)

Classified By: Pol Consul Dennis W. Hearne for Reasons 1.5a

¶1. (C) Summary and Introduction. On July 30, a State/DoD delegation, led by WHA PDAS James Derham, met with Brazilian
Ministry of Defense interlocutors to discuss mechanisms through which the GOB would provide information to the USG
about the status of Brazil,s shootdown program once that program begins. The two sides generated a working text that
would provide the USG timely access to GOB data (i.e., reports and video/audio tape) in cases where Brazilian interceptors
employed lethal force. In addition, the GOB committed to providing the USG with: a) notification of any substantial changes
to program procedures and training requirements, and b) the opportunity for periodic consultations that might address the
number of events that stop short of lethal force and the date and location of such events.

¶2. (C) Both sides agreed to take the working text back to their respective interagency processes for a more complete review.
The GOB will produce, in Portuguese, the official version of the working text, by the middle of the week of August 2.
State will generate an English version of that document shortly thereafter. The USG delegation proposed that, when finalized,
the document and two annexes that detailed the GOB's procedures, would serve as attachments to an exchange of diplomatic notes,
that would be initiated by the GOB. In its current form, the exchange would represent a political commitment on the part of
the GOB, as opposed to a binding international agreement. End Summary and Introduction.

¶3. (C) Fernando Abreu, Chief of Staff of Defense Minister Viegas, led the Brazilian delegation, which consisted of Orlando
Almeida (Special Advisor to Viegas), Air Force Brigadier General Machado (Sub-Chief of Operations of the MOD Joint Staff),
and Air Force Colonel Servan (Vice-Chief of the GOB Air Defense Command). After welcoming remarks, Abreu noted that the GOB
planned to initiate its shootdown program on October 17, with great emphasis being placed on transparency for both the
Brazilian public and foreign governments. He then turned the floor over to General Machado, who launched into an extended
description of Brazil,s air defense infrastructure and the procedural safeguards associated with the GOB,s implementation
of shootdown.

In particular, Machado noted that:

-- Since 1979, the GOB had been safely conducting air interceptions (i.e., approaches short of lethal force), and was well
aware of the need to scrupulously observe ICAO requirements during the course of aerial interception. The use of lethal force,
he emphasized, was merely an extension of the GOB,s current interception efforts.

-- Brazil,s operational norms for its airspace defense system were contained in a large classified document known as the
NOSDA (the Portuguese acronym). Though the Air Force was not able to provide the USG with a copy of the NOSDA, he emphasized
that the documents that were passed to the delegation representatives during the course of the July 29 talks, in addition to
the GOB's two sets of responses to the USG's questions about GOB shootdown procedures, were accurate summaries of the contents
of the NOSDA. (In brief, these summaries describe a process of detection, monitoring, identification, interrogation, investigation,
and warnings prior to the use of lethal force, as well as the procedures and circumstances under which the GOB would use lethal force).

-- The use of both warning shots and lethal force would only be authorized by the Commander of Brazil,s central air defense center.
Lethal force would only be employed in cases where intel information indicated that the suspect air track was tied to narco-trafficking.

-- The co-location of civil aviation facilities with military controllers, along with reliance on a common Air Force radar feed,
facilitates the identification of routine civil aviation traffic.

-- The GOB plans to conduct an extensive media campaign, using television and radio spots, sporting events, and notices to airmen
(NOTAMs) to publicize the contemplated October 17 initiation of its shootdown program. A parallel effort would be aimed at the
international public as well.

-- The training regime for program personnel includes training for pilots, air controllers, and communications personnel.
In particular, he noted, those pilots who conduct air interceptions receive more extensive and specialized training than their
non-interception counterparts.

¶4. (C) Subsequent discussion then refined the mechanism through which the USG would receive information about program events.
Abreu noted that the GOB was open to passing comprehensive information to the USG on an informal basis, but that any arrangement
that smacked of USG intrusion into Brazilian sovereignty was a non-starter, given the potentially negative reaction by the Brazil
congress and public. Still, Abreu pledged that the GOB would:

-- provide, on an urgent basis, the AmEmbassy Brasilia Air Force Attache with information regarding any shootdown incident.
Such information would be provided to the general public as well.

-- At the USG,s request, meet with USG representatives to provide background information about the program,s progress (i.e.,
the number of suspect tracks detected, interceptions, and warning shots as well as other similar data), and

-- notify the USG of any changes in security procedures, non-classified checklists, flight plan requirements, and training regimen.

¶5. (C) Begin Comment. As a result of these discussions, it is clear that

-- other than for information on shootdown events

-- the USG will have to initiate contacts with the GOB when securing information on the shootdown program. It may be worthwhile
for USG agencies to: a) establish a checklist of information that they would like the AmEmbassy Brasilia Air Force Attache to obtain,
b) and provide guidance on the frequency with which the Attache should seek consultations with the GOB. End Comment.

¶6. (C) PDAS Derham proposed that the two sides ultimately document the understanding reached regarding information sharing through
an exchange of diplomatic notes. The diplomatic notes would expressly reference three attachments: the GOP responses to the first
and second set of questions from the USG regarding GOB operational procedures and the working text that was the subject of this round
of discussions. The diplomatic note would also reflect the GOB's assurances that the shootdown program would only be directed at
aircraft reasonably suspected to be primarily engaged in illicit drug trafficking. The GOB clarified that this meant that aircraft
carrying drugs or aircraft carrying money, weapons, or precursor chemicals to exchange for drugs could be subject to lethal force.
(The scope of the GOB's program thus falls within the scope of the 22 U.S.C. 2291-4, i.e., the immunity statute, as further
articulated by DOJ in the context of the Colombia ABD program.)

¶7. (C) Abreu was open to the idea of an exchange of diplomatic notes, though he indicated that he would need to check with others
(in particular, Minister of Defense Viegas) prior to providing us with the GOB,s formal answer. Both sides then explored possible
language for inclusion in the exchange of diplomatic notes (which would be initiated by the GOB). For Abreu, a red-line was any
language which indicated that the exchange of diplomatic notes would be a binding international agreement, as that would mean that
the text would need to be approved by the Brazilian congress. WHA PDAS Derham cleared message.

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 BRASILIA

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 BRASILIA 000623 

SIPDIS 

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/15/2014 
TAGS: BR MARR MCAP MOPS PINR PREL PTER SNAR POL MIL
SUBJECT: BRAZIL: CJCS MEETING WITH INSTITUTIONAL SECURITY MINISTER FELIX, 

10 MARCH 2004 

Classified By: DENNIS HEARNE, POLITICAL COUNSELOR. REASONS: 1.5 (B)(D) 

¶1. (C) SUMMARY. Brazil's senior security and intelligence official, 

Institutional Security Minister Jorge Felix, told visiting CJCS Myers 

on 10 March in Brasilia that narcotrafficking poses a grave threat to 

Brazilian national security. The threat is manifest in international 

arms-for-drugs trafficking involving Brazilian organized crime gangs, 

in the spread of corruption in Brazilian institutions, and in widespread 

violence against the public. Felix expressed concern that narcotraffickers 

might place innocent civilians on their aircraft, for use as human shields 

against lethal force interdictions, and said such issues made the decision 

to implement the shootdown law a difficult one that the President must make. 

Nonetheless, he reiterated the position that the GOB considers narcotrafficking 

to be a threat to national security. On terrorism, Felix said Brazilian authorities

have found "no evidence" of operational terrorist activities in Brazil, but said 

that the potential "bears watching." End summary. 

¶2. (U) CJCS General Richard Myers, accompanied by Charge, ORA Chief, DATT and JCS 

staff met with Minister Felix and senior officials of the Institutional Security 

Cabinet (Portuguese acronym GSI) at the Planalto Palace (Presidential offices) on 

10 March 2004. The GSI is an interagency organization within the Presidency that functions, 

in roughly equivalent USG terms, as a combination NSC, ONDCP, DCI and general crisis management 

center. A cabinet-level officer and general in the Brazilian army, Felix is in charge of the GSI 

and serves as the President's senior security and intelligence advisor. 

SHOOTDOWN 

¶3. (S) General Myers asked Minister Felix whether narcotrafficking represents a 

grave threat to Brazil's national security. Felix responded that narcotrafficking

does pose a major threat to Brazilian national security on both a "wholesale" and

"retail" level. Elaborating, Felix said that the "wholesale" threat is seen in the

growth of international drugs for weapons trafficking between Brazilian criminal

organizations and Colombian groups, and also in the spread of narcotics-related 

corruption through Brazilian institutions. On the "retail" level, the dramatic 

level of hard drug use within Brazil is harming the population, in terms of health 

and exposure to increased criminal violence. 

¶4. (S) General Myers then asked Felix whether he was comfortable that implementing

a shootdown law in Brazil would be a positive development. Felix replied that he

has some concerns that narcotraffickers "will not play by the same rules as we do,

" and may react to shootdown measures by placing innocent women and children on 

narcotrafficking aircraft, for use as human shields against the use of lethal force

in interdiction operations. Such concerns make the GOB's decision to implement a 

difficult one that, Felix said, will have to be made by President Lula da Silva. 

However, Felix reiterated the position that narcotrafficking constitutes a grave 

threat to Brazilian national and public security. 

TERRORISM 

¶5. (C) Turning to the issue of terrorism, Felix said that in the years before the 

September 11 attacks the GOB had routinely declared that Brazil was free of

terrorist activities. Now, he said the GOB's position is that it has so far 

"found no evidence" of operational terrorist activities in Brazil. He clearly 

stressed the concept of "evidence" -- as opposed to saying no such activity exists

-- asking his interpreter to repeat this phrase with emphasis to the 

USG interlocutors. The potential for increased terrorist activity in Brazil 

"bears watching," Felix added. 

¶6. (S) Felix affirmed that operational cooperation between GOB and USG 

intelligence and security agencies is excellent. The tri-border area of Brazil, 

Argentina and Paraguay is a "complex area" where various types of money laundering,

counterfeiting and other clandestine activities overlap one another, Felix said. 

There is clearly potential for Islamic terrorist fund-raising within this shadowy

mix, Felix said, but the GOB also must be careful to not tarnish unfairly the 

image of the more than eight million law-abiding Brazilians of Arab descent. 

¶7. (U) General Myers did not have the opportunity to clear this message. 

HRINAK